







Conceptual Analysis and Normative Inquiry in Sport
A Cautionary Note
Abstract
Bernard Suits’s classic definitions of games and sport have been widely credited as impor-
tant philosophical achievements. I share that laudable view of his definitional work. But in 
this essay I warn against a growing tendency in the philosophy of sport literature to gloss 
Suits’s definition of these key concepts as metaphysical achievements as well, as discover-
ies of the true essences of games and sport. I focus my critical attention on the most recent 
example of such metaphysical overreach, Colin McGinn’s account of games featured in his 
recent book, Truth	by	Analysis:	Games,	Names,	 and	Philosophy. I argue that McGinn’s 
metaphysical interpretation of Suits’s conceptual analysis of games and sport is ill-con-





















































































McGinn’s	metaphysical	 rendering	 of	 it.	As	McGinn	 sees	 it,	 Suits	 is	 to	be	
credited	not	only	 for	having	defined	games	and	sport,	 for	explicating	 their	
necessary	and	sufficient	conditions,	but	as	well	for	having	discovered	their	
very	essences,	 those	essential	 features	 that	make	 them	 the	special	kinds	of	
human	 endeavour	 they	 at	 bottom	are.	This	 is	 the	 bold	metaphysical	 thesis	


































According	 to	Suits,	 and	after	him	McGinn,	 the	other	cardinal	mistake	 that	
Wittgenstein	 made	 that	 prevented	 him	 from	 grasping	 what	 features	 games	
have	in	common	is	that	he	trained	his	sights	on	the	surface	resemblances	of	



































mark	 them	as	 the	 things	 that	 they	are.	More	specifically,	 I	dispute	 that	 the	
properties	of	games	and	sport	that	Suits’s	uncovers	belong	exclusively	on	the	
object	side	rather	than	on	the	linguistic	side	of	conceptual	inquiry,	that	they	




such	 that	 they	bear	no	 trace	of	 the	descriptive	and	normative	markers	 laid	
down	by	them.
My	counter-thesis	 that	 there	 is	no	way	sport	 is	apart	 from	our	descriptions	
of	what	we	purport	it	is,	to	include	what	we	take	to	be	its	main	purpose	and	








A	closer	 look	at	Suits’s	 conceptual	 analysis	of	 sport,	 contra	McGinn,	 sug-
gests	 as	much.	For	 the	data	Suits	 relied	on	 to	 come	up	with	his	definition	
were	derived	from	what	he	termed	“hardcore”	games,	hardcore	in	the	sense	
that	if	the	things	that	fall	into	this	class	are	not	games	then	nothing	is.	He	thus	






























tion	 from,	and	not,	as	he	 insinuated	 in	other	passages	of	The Grasshopper	





























that	 philosophy	 is	 not	 the	 naturalistic	 enter-
prise	 that	Quine	would	have	us	 believe	 that	
it	 is	when	he	 insisted	 it	 is	 “continuous	with	
science”	(VIII).
4
For	 ease	 of	 exposition,	 I	will	when	 feasible	
from	this	point	on	restrict	my	attention	to	the	
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the	deontology	 it	 committed	 them	 to,	which	 required	 they	give	 their	 all	 to	
winning,	and	professionals	objected	to	the	concept	of	the	gentleman	athlete	
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William J. Morgan
Konceptualna analiza i normativno ispitivanje u sportu
Napomena
Sažetak
Klasična definicija igre i sporta Bernarda Suitsa uzima se kao značajno filozofsko postignuće. 
Po pitanju njegova definicijskog rada, slažem se s takvim hvalećim pogledom. No u ovom eseju 
upozoravam na rastuću tendenciju u literaturi iz filozofije sporta da se Suitsove definicije ovih 
ključnih koncepcija površno uzimaju i kao metafizičko postignuće, kao otkriće prave biti igre i 
sporta. Svoju kritičku pozornost usmjeravam na nedavni primjer takvih metafizičkih pretjeriva-
nja, na razmatranje igre Colina McGinna u njegovu djelu Truth	by	Analysis:	Games,	Names,	
and	Philosophy. Argumentiram da je McGinnova metafizička interpretacija Suitsove konceptu-
alne analize igre i sporta nevaljala i ispitujem negativne normativne posljedice interpretiranja 




Konzeptuelle Analyse und normative Untersuchung im Sport
Ein Warnhinweis
Zusammenfassung
Bernard Suits̕ klassische Definitionen von Spielen und Sport werden weithin als bedeutsame 
philosophische errungenschaften anerkannt. Ich teile diesen lobenswerten Standpunkt zu seiner 
definitorischen Arbeit. In diesem Aufsatz warne ich jedoch vor einer wachsenden Tendenz in der 
Literatur aus dem Bereich der Sportphilosophie, Suits̕  Definition dieser Schlüsselkonzeptionen 
auch als metaphysische errungenschaften, als entdeckung der wahren essenzen von Spielen 
5
Bernard	 Williams	 provides	 a	 positive	 gloss	
on	 Nietzsche’s	 admonition:	 “The	 reflective	




ing,	 or	 is	 part	 of	 it.	Philosophy	has	 to	 learn	
the	 lesson	 that	 conceptual	 description	 (or,	
conceptual	analysis)	is	not	self-sufficient;	and	
that	 such	 projects	 as	 deriving	 our	 concepts	
a	priori	 from	universal	 conditions	of	human	
life	(…)	are	likely	to	leave	unexplained	many	
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und Sport zu beschönigen. Ich konzentriere meine kritische Aufmerksamkeit auf das jüngste Bei-
spiel für eine solche metaphysische Überanstrengung, auf Colin McGinns Bericht über Spiele, 
der in seinem kürzlich erschienenen Buch, Truth	by	Analysis:	Games,	Names,	and	Philosophy, 
vorgestellt wurde. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, dass McGinns metaphysische Interpretation von 
Suits̕  konzeptueller Analyse der Spiele und des Sports schlecht konzipiert ist und untersuche 




Analyse conceptuelle et enquête normative dans le sport
Remarque
Résumé
Les définitions classiques des jeux et du sport de Bernard Suits ont été largement reconnues 
comme un acquis important en philosophie. Je partage ce point de vue louable mais dans cet 
essai je mets en garde contre une tendance croissante dans la littérature philosophique du sport 
à masquer la définition suit sienne de ces concepts clés par des concepts métaphysiques, et à les 
considérer comme la découverte de l’essence réelle des jeux et du sport. Je concentre toute mon 
attention critique sur le plus récent des exemples d’un tel abus métaphysique, sur les considéra-
tions de Colin McGinn sur les jeux dans son livre Truth	by	Analysis:	Games,	Names,	and	Philo-
sophy, publié récemment. J’affirme que l’interprétation métaphysique de McGinn de l’analyse 
conceptuelle des jeux et du sport élaboré par Suits est malavisée et j’examine les conséquences 
normatives d’une telle interprétation.
Mots-clés
analyse	conceptuelle,	enquête	normative,	métaphysique,	essence,	propriétés	sociales
